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Abstract
In a closed economy, the infinite-horizon and the overlapping generations (OG) model
prescribe diametrically opposite policies on factor taxation: the former argues that the growth-
maximizing capital income tax rate should be set to zero, whereas the latter argues that it
should be set as high as possible. This note investigates the issue by taking into account global
capital market integration. We show that the long-run growth-maximizing capital income tax
rate in a small open OG economy is decreasing as the economy’s capital market is increasingly
integrated with the rest of the world, and will be equal to zero as prescribed in the infinite-
horizon model once the degree of integration becomes sufficiently high.
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1 Introduction
How labor and capital income should be taxed in the context of growth is an unresolved issue.
On the one hand, in the infinite-horizon setup, Lucas (1990), Rebelo (1991), Jones et al. (1993)
and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (1998) have shown that the growth maximizing capital income tax rate
should be set to zero since any positive tax rate on capital income reduces the rate of return on
capital, which in turn curbs the saving incentive and economic growth. This result suggests that,
to raise a required amount of tax revenue, labor income should bear the main thrust. On the
other hand, in the finite-horizon overlapping generations (OG) setup, Jones and Manuelli (1992)
and Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) argue that shifting the tax burden from labor to capital income
may benefit economic growth and hence setting the latter tax rate as high as possible can be
optimal.
To understand the intuition behind the result in the OG model, it is best to consider a two-
period OG with the log utility function, ln c1t + β ln c
2
t+1, where c
1
t is generation t ’s consumption
in period 1, c2t+1 is their consumption in period 2, and β is a discount factor. This utility function
can be equivalently expressed in Cobb-Douglas form (c1t )(c
2
t+1)
β . It is then well known that
the wealth allocated to c2t+1, which amounts to saving in this setup, will be determined by the
preference β and will be completely independent of the capital income tax rate. Put formally, the
interest elasticity of saving is zero in the case of the log utility function. Since the young earn
only labor income and engage in saving while the old earn only capital income and save nothing
in this OG model, to stimulate saving and growth, it is optimal to set the labor tax rate to zero
while the capital income tax rate is set at the maximum.
Caballe´ (1998) introduces altruistic preferences into the OG model, showing that when the
interest elasticity of saving is sufficiently small, there exists a threshold value of intergenera-
tional altruism, below which the growth maximizing capital tax rate is one, whereas above that
value it equals zero. However, this finding does not reconcile the infinite-horizon model with the
OG model, in the sense that the OG model de facto becomes dynastic or infinite horizon when
intergenerational altruism is high.
In this note we argue that the diametrically opposite growth policy prescriptions on factor
taxation between the infinite-horizon and the OG model will be mitigated and even disappear
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if one takes into consideration the increasing degree of integration in the world capital market.
Specifically, we show that the growth-maximizing capital tax rate in the OG model is decreasing
with the increasing degree of integration in the world capital market, and will be equal to zero as
prescribed in the infinite-horizon setup when the world capital market is sufficiently integrated.1
The mechanism behind our result is intuitive. With the opening up of the world capital
market, domestic capital will flow out to seek higher rates of return abroad in response to a
higher domestic capital tax rate. This capital outflow implies a disconnection between domestic
saving and domestic investment, which in turn implies in an OG setting that a higher domestic
capital tax rate does not necessarily result in higher domestic capital formation even though it
does result in higher domestic saving. With the increasing integration of the world capital market,
the force of capital outflow will become more and more dominating and will eventually lead to
the prescription of a zero capital tax once the integration is sufficiently high.
For sure, this is not the first paper to address the non-optimality of taxing capital income to
the maximum in an OG growth model. For instance, Ho & Wang (2007) show that the growth-
maximizing capital income tax rate is between zero and one and is decreasing with the severity
of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Their result arises because the capital
income tax policy worsens the adverse selection problem in the credit market which in turn gives
rise to a negative effect on growth. While their main focus is to argue in favor of a less-than-
one growth-maximizing capital income tax rate in the presence of asymmetric information, the
present paper aims to show how the opposite long-run growth tax policy prescribed by OG and
the infinite horizon models will become unified under global capital market integration.
2 Setup
Consider a small open economy in which there is an infinite sequence of two-period-lived over-
lapping generations with homogeneous, non-altruistic agents. All generations are identical in size
and composition. The population size of each generation is normalized to one.
1Correira (1996) shows that the celebrated result in Chamley (1986) - the long-run optimal capital income tax
rate should be zero - can be extended to the circumstances of small open economies with frictionless, international
capital mobility.
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The utility function of the representative agent is given by:
U(c1t ) + βU(c
2
t+1) (1)
with 1 > β > 0 and U(c) = log(c). c1t and c
2
t+1 denote the young agent’s consumption and
the old agent’s consumption, respectively. Using a logarithmic utility function implies that the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is equal to one. Such an assumption will make our results
most transparent.
Each young agent born in time period t supplies endowed labor inelastically to earn wage
income wt. Since an agent when old is not endowed with any labor and hence no wage income,
he needs to save for old-age consumption. His saving is allocated between domestic investment
and international investment, which are denoted by it and bt, respectively. The domestic interest
rate at time t is given by rt and the rate of return in the world capital market, rb, is exogenously
given for the small open economy. In order to keep the focus on the case with capital outflow, we
assume that rb > rt holds throughout the rest of the discussion. A young agent needs to incur a
cost µ b
2
t
kt
to identify and to materialize the investment opportunities in the world capital market,
where µ ∈ (0,∞) is a parameter. To be compatible with perpetual growth, this cost is set to be
in proportion to the capital stock per capita, kt. In the sequel, the inverse of the parameter µ
will be interpreted as a measure of the degree of integration of the domestic economy with the
international capital market. Full integration takes place when µ tends to zero.
Each old agent consumes his net returns from both domestic investment and international in-
vestment. Given that the government imposes proportional taxes on domestic labor and domestic
capital income at flat rates τw and τr respectively, the young agent’s consumption will be
c1t = (1− τw)wt − it − bt − µ
b2t
kt
,
and the old agent’s consumption will be
c2t+1 = [1 + (1− τr)rt+1]it + (1 + rb)bt
subject to τw ∈ [0, 1] and τr ∈ [0, 1].
There are many competitive firms in the economy. At the beginning of time period t, each
firm produces a homogeneous consumption good according to the following production function:
yt = f(kt, lt) = kθt (Atlt)
1−θ (2)
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with 0 < θ < 1, where kt and lt are the capital stock per capita and labor, respectively, and At is
a technology parameter which represents the technological spill-overs. Following the endogenous-
growth literature, we postulate that At = kt so that the economy exhibits sustainable growth
in the long run. Since only young agents are endowed with labor, which is normalized to a
unity measure, the competitive rental rate of capital and the wage rate of labor are equal to,
respectively:
rt = θ, (3)
wt = (1− θ)kt. (4)
It is also assumed that capital depreciates completely after one period of use. As usual, output
can be used for consumption or investment.
The government finances the stream of public expenditures, which is assumed to be equal to
a constant fraction, α, of output by collecting revenues from flat rate taxes on wage income and
capital income in each time period. It is straightforward to show that the government budget
constraint is given by:2
α = (1− θ)τw + θτr.
The above equation clearly indicates that the capital and labor income tax rates are negatively
related to each other, given θ and α. In the next section we are going to show that, depending on
the degree of global capital market integration, the growth-maximizing capital income tax rate
can be equal to one, between zero and one, or even become zero.
3 The Optimal Capital Income Tax Rate
From the assumption regarding the utility function and the agent’s budget constraints, one can
obtain the following first-order conditions which describe the perfect foresight competitive equi-
librium for exogenous sequences of wt, rt, kt, rb, τw and τr.
c2t+1
c1t
= β[1 + (1− τr)θ], (5)
c2t+1
c1t
=
β(1 + rb)kt
2µbt + kt
. (6)
2See the Appendix for the derivation.
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We have applied (3) to deriving (5) and (6). Combining them gives:
zt ≡ bt
kt
=
b
k
=
1
2µ
[
1 + rb
1 + (1− τr)θ − 1
]
.
Note that zt is always positive based on the assumption that rb > rt = θ and τr ∈ [0, 1]. It is
worth pointing out that zt is increasing with the capital income tax rate τr. This result is intuitive
- a higher domestic capital income tax will all else equal enhance people’s incentives to engage in
“capital flight.”
It can be readily verified that the economy always grows along the balanced growth path at the
rate g, given by3:
g ≡ yt+1
yt
=
kt+1
kt
=
bt+1
bt
=
β(1− θ)
1 + β
(1− α− θτr
1− θ )−
1
2µ(1 + β)
[
1 + rb
1 + (1− τr)θ − 1
] [(1 + rb)(1 + β2 )
1 + (1− τr)θ +
β
2
]
. (7)
Now we are ready to see why taxing capital income generates two opposite forces on the economic
growth of a small open economy. The first term on the right-hand side of (7) represents the
conventional growth-enhancing effect of taxing capital income in the OG literature. In the small
open economy case, one additional adverse growth effect of capital income taxation is captured
by the second term. This effect arises primarily because increasing the capital income tax rate
changes the trade off between domestic investment and international lending against the former,
inducing young agents to lend more (i.e., more capital outflow) in the world capital market.
To formalize the above discussion, we take the partial derivative of (7) with respect to τr,
giving:
∂g
∂τr
= β − (2 + β)(1 + rb)
2
2µ[1 + (1− τr)θ]3 +
(1 + rb)
2µ[1 + (1− τr)θ]2 = 0.
Some algebraic manipulations transform the above growth-maximizing first-order condition into:
µ[1 + (1− τ∗r )θ]3 =
(1 + rb)
2β
{(2 + β)(1 + rb)− [1 + (1− τ∗r )θ]} ,
where τ∗r = τ∗r (µ, θ, rb) is the growth maximizing capital income tax rate.4 We call the left-hand
3The derivation of this equation can be found in the Appendix.
4Since this is a third-order equation, it should have three roots. We then rewrite it as:
[1 + (1− τ∗r )θ]3 + (1 + rb)[1 + (1− τ
∗
r )θ]
2µβ
− (1 + rb)
2(2 + β)
2µβ
= 0.
Let p = (1+rb)
2µβ
and q = − (1+rb)2(2+β)
2µβ
. Since 4p3+27q2 > 0 holds, this equation has one real root and two complex
roots. We focus on the case with the real root.
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side of the above equation locus LL and the right-hand side locus RR. Note that the locus LL is
decreasing with τr whereas the locus RR is increasing with it. The intersection of these two loci
determines the growth maximizing τ∗r as shown in Figure 1, which is between zero and one if the
following condition on the model parameters is met:
(1 + rb)
2β(1 + θ)3
[(2 + β)(1 + rb)− (1 + θ)] ≡ µ < µ < µ¯ ≡ (1 + rb)2β [(2 + β)(1 + rb)− 1].
It is easy to show that µ is indeed the degree of integration of the world capital market when the
event τ∗r = 0 occurs while µ¯ applies when the event τ∗r = 1 takes place. Put simply, this condition
specifies a range of values of µ in which 0 < τ∗r < 1 exists.5
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
Note that increasing µ will shift the locus LL rightward in Figure 1, giving rise to a bigger
growth maximizing capital income tax rate. When the value of µ satisfies µ ∈ [µ¯,∞), indicating
a low degree of integration with the world capital market, the second and the third terms in the
growth maximizing first-order condition will be insignificant. Then it will be growth maximizing
to set τ∗r as high as possible in this case, in accordance with the finding as in Jones & Manuelli
(1992) and Uhlig & Yanagawa (1996). On the other hand, when µ ∈ (0, µ] holds, the growth
retarding effect of capital income taxation will dominate, making it optimal to untax any capital
income. Consequently, if a small open economy is sufficiently integrated with the world capital
market, the long-run growth maximizing capital income tax rate in the OG model should be zero,
as in the infinite horizon setup (see for example Roubini & Milesi-Ferretti (1994)).
To sum up, we obtain:
Proposition 1. The long-run growth maximizing capital income tax rate in a small open OG
economy is decreasing as the economy’s capital market increasingly integrates with the rest of the
5The second-order condition displayed below holds:
∂2g
∂τ2r
= − θ(1 + rb)
µ[1 + (1− τr)θ]3
{
3(2 + β)(1 + rb)
2[1 + (1− τr)θ] − 1
}
< 0
since min
{
1+rb
1+(1−τr)θ
}
= 0.5 and hence
{
3(2+β)(1+rb)
2[1+(1−τr)θ] − 1
}
> 0 according to the parametric configurations 0 < θ <
1, 0 < β < 1, τw ∈ [0, 1] and τr ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, τ∗r is a maximum.
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world, and will be equal to zero as prescribed in the infinite-horizon model once the degree of
integration becomes sufficiently high.
The major finding that increasing capital market integration tends to shift the tax burden
from capital income to labor income is supported by empirical studies. For example, Bretschger
and Hettich (2002), using a panel data of 14 OECD countries for the period 1967-1996, find
empirical evidence for the argument that capital market integration reduces corporate tax rates,
which are used as the measure for capital taxation. Winner (2005) shows that, in a sample of 23
OECD countries, the degree of capital mobility exhibits a significant, negative relationship with
a country’s capital income tax rate whereas its relationship with the labor income tax rate is
positive for the period from 1965 to 2000.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the growth effects of factor income taxation in a small open economy with
frictional capital mobility across countries. To obtain maximum clarity, we choose to work with a
standard two-period OG model with investment-driven perpetual growth. As is typical in this kind
of model, a representative young agent uses his wage income to support consumption and domestic
investment. Liberalizing international capital mobility enables him to be a lender in the world
capital market since the rate of return on investment in the world capital market is higher than
that in the local one. In these circumstances, the main tenet is that capital income taxation will
intensify capital outflow, thereby giving rise to a negative effect on economic growth. Therefore,
in contrast with the conventional wisdom derived from the OG literature, our theoretical findings
suggest that setting capital income tax rates as high as possible is growth promoting in a small
open economy only if the degree of integration with the world capital market is low. As the degree
of integration increases, the growth maximizing capital income tax rate should fall below one and
will equal zero when the degree of integration is sufficiently large. The growth-maximizing policy
prescriptions on factor taxation between the infinite-horizon and the OG model are eventually
reconciled.
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Appendix (Not intended for publication)
The Derivation of the Government Budget Constraint
Since the government imposes proportional, flat tax rates τw and τr on domestic wage income
and domestic capital income, respectively, and the public expenditures are a constant fraction of
total output, its budget constraint is given by:
αyt = τwwt + τrrtit−1.
Substituting the market equilibrium condition kt+1 = it with (3) and (4) into the above equation
yields:
αyt = (1− θ)τwkt + θτrkt.
Since At = kt and lt = 1, it follows that yt = kt holds in equilibrium. Therefore, the government
budget constraint can be written as:
α = (1− θ)τw + θτr.
The Derivation of the Domestic Investment Equation and the Growth Equation
Substituting c1t = (1− τw)wt− it− bt− µ b
2
t
kt
and c2t+1 = [1+ (1− τr)θ]it+ (1+ rb)bt into (5) gives:
[1 + (1− τr)θ]it + (1 + rb)bt
(1− τw)wt − it − bt − µ b
2
t
kt
= β[1 + (1− τr)θ].
Rewriting it as:
[1 + (1− τr)θ]it + (1 + rb)bt = β[1 + (1− τr)θ][(1− τw)wt − it − bt − µb
2
t
kt
],
[1 + (1− τr)θ](1 + β)it = β[1 + (1− τr)θ](1− τw)wt − bt{(1 + rb) + β[1 + (1− τr)θ]
+β[1 + (1− τr)θ]µ bt
kt
}.
By associating it with btkt =
1
2µ
[
1+rb
1+(1−τr)θ − 1
]
, the above equation becomes
[1 + (1− τr)θ](1 + β)it = β[1 + (1− τr)θ](1− τw)wt − kt2µ
[
1 + rb
1 + (1− τr)θ − 1
]
{(1 + rb)(1 + β2 )
+
β
2
[1 + (1− τr)θ]},
it =
β
1 + β
(1− τw)wt − kt2µ(1 + β)
[
1 + rb
1 + (1− τr)θ − 1
] [(1 + rb)(1 + β2 )
1 + (1− τr)θ +
β
2
]
.
8
Combining the market equilibrium condition kt+1 = it and (4) with the above equation and using
the government budget constraint yields
g ≡ kt+1
kt
=
β(1− θ)
1 + β
(1− α− θτr
1− θ )−
1
2µ(1 + β)
[
1 + rb
1 + (1− τr)θ − 1
] [(1 + rb)(1 + β2 )
1 + (1− τr)θ +
β
2
]
.
Using equation (2) with At = kt and lt = 1 in association with the result that btkt =
b
k , one can
show that yt+1yt =
bt+1
bt
= kt+1kt ≡ g holds.
References
Bretschger, L., Hettich, F., 2002. Globalization, capital mobility and tax competition: theory
and evidence for OECD countries. European Journal of Political Economy 18, 695–716.
Caballe´, J., 1998. Growth effects of taxation under altruism and low elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Economic Journal 108, 92–104.
Chamley, C., 1986. Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives.
Econometrica 54, 607–622.
Correira, I. H., 1996. Dynamic optimal taxation in small open economies. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 20, 691–708.
Ho, W. H., Wang, Y., 2007. Factor income taxation and growth under asymmetric information.
Journal of Public Economics 91, 775–789.
Jones, L.E., Manuelli, R.E., 1992. Finite lifetimes and growth. Journal of Economic Theory 58,
171–197.
Jones, L.E., Manuelli, R.E., Rossi, P.E., 1993. Optimal taxation in models of endogenous growth.
Journal of Political Economy 101, 485–517.
Lucas, R.E., 1990. Supply-side economics: an analytical review. Oxford Economic Papers 42,
293–316.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., Roubini, N., 1998. On the taxation of human and physical capital in models
of endogenous growth. Journal of Public Economics 70, 237–254.
Rebelo, S., 1991. Long run policy analysis and long run growth. Journal of Political Economy
99, 500–521.
9
Roubini, N., Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., 1994. Taxation and endogenous growth in open economies.
NBER working paper No. 4881.
Uhlig, H., Yanagawa, N., 1996. Increasing the capital income tax may lead to faster growth.
European Economic Review 40, 1521–1540.
Winner, H., 2005. Has tax competition emerged in OECD countries? Evidence from panel data.
International Tax and Public Finance 12, 667–687.
10
